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This paper reviews the relevance of the UN, 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), and particularly the so-called participation rights, to premature 
babies and their care. The review is illustrated with examples drawn from a study of 
four neonatal intensive care units, NICU. The paper begins with the background on 
human and children’s rights, on research about childhood, babies and participation, 
and on the neonatal research study. Participation rights include rights to: life and 
survival; a name, identity and nationality; contact with the baby’s family; respect for 
the child’s cultural background, and inherent human dignity; the child’s right to 
express views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views to be given due 
weight according to the age and ability of the child; the opportunity to be heard during 
proceedings that affect the child; freedom of expression and information, of thought, 
conscience and religion, of association and peaceful assembly, rest and leisure, play, 
and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts; disabled children should enjoy a 
full and decent life and active participation in the community with the fullest possible 
social inclusion. The paper concludes that respect for babies’ participation rights is 
feasible, immediate, integral and indispensable to adequate neonatal care, and that 




Is it appropriate or useful to phrase premature babies’ needs, welfare, or best 
interests in the language of babies’ rights? Can babies be rights-holders? This paper 
reviews the relevance of the UN, 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC), and particularly the so-called participation rights, to premature babies and 
their care. The review is illustrated with examples drawn from a study of four 
neonatal intensive care units, NICU. The first part of this paper presents the 
background on human and children’s rights, on research about childhood, babies and 
participation, and on the neonatal research study. Examples from the study illustrate 
how participation rights relate to premature babies. The paper concludes that respect 
for babies’ participation rights is feasible, immediate, integral and indispensable to 
adequate neonatal care, and that babies’ rights justify and validate high standards of 
care.    
 
Rights 
Rights are justified on two main grounds. Firstly, they may be seen as universal, 
inalienable to all members of the human family (the UNCRC is ratified by all 
governments except in the USA and Somalia) and legal entitlements that defend and 
respect every citizen. Citizenship from birth entitles the child to a legal identity, and 
the right to expect certain services, protections and amenities from the state. Babies 
can easily be included in these concepts of rights. Secondly and alternatively, 
citizenship with its civil rights may be justified as a status that is gradually learned or 
earned or developed towards, and is granted by age, sex, or merit. Traditionally, 
English law has restricted children’s rights and regarded children up to 21 and more 
recently 18 years as legal “infants”, literally “not speaking”. Current English policy on 
citizenship education (QCA, 1998) slips uncertainly between education for future 
adult citizenship or the education of children who are citizens now. Traditional links 
between a set age of majority linked with citizens’ participation or civil rights and the 
key right to a voice and to freedom of self-expression were replaced during the 1980s 
by competence or maturity. English case law now respects the decisions of children 
who have the understanding and discretion to make informed and wise decisions in 
their own best interests Gillick [1985]. The UNCRC accords to children who are able 
to form and express their own views, “the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child” (UNCRC, 1989: 121). Neither 
article 12 nor Gillick states a minimum age, and these standards lean towards Holt’s 
view (1976) that children should be able to exercise their rights when they become 
able and willing to do so. Does the ability-competence criterion open all children’s 
rights from the above second concept of age-based rights towards the first universal 
concept that embraces all members of the human family? And are even premature 
babies able to form and express their own views?   
   In Britain, the fetus is legally not “a person” (Montgomery, 1997:401) and has no 
rights throughout the 40 or more weeks of pregnancy, except for one right after 24 
weeks:2 protection from termination of pregnancy. This right to life, however, is 
qualified in three ways. Firstly, termination is allowed up to term if “serious handicap” 
is detected (1990 HFE Act). Secondly, in 2002 for example, although 2,753 abortions 
between the 20th and the 24th week were recorded, gestational ages may be under-
estimated in records to allow abortions after 24 weeks (Times 8.9.03). Thirdly, 
practitioners are advised to respect women’s refusal of interventions during 
pregnancy and labour, including interventions intended to save the life of the fetus 
(RCOG, 1994).   
                                                 
1   Numbers in brackets refer to UNCRC articles. 
2  “Weeks” indicate the length of gestation. 
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  In marked contrast, from birth children are entitled to legal personhood, partly 
denoted by the complex and comprehensive UNCRC rights. The UNCRC preamble 
recognises the importance of special care within the family for the immature child in 
“an atmosphere of happiness and love and understanding” although these cannot be 
rights because they cannot be willed or enforced. UNCRC rights are qualified in that 
“the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” (3), taking account of 
the rights and duties of parents or other responsible persons “to provide, in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the [UNCRC] rights” (5).  
  Premature babies can easily be seen as benefiting from their UNCRC provision 
rights to services, to health care, education (of their parents and carers), welfare and 
amenities (Alderson in press). Babies clearly benefit from their UNCRC rights to 
protection from abuse, neglect, violence and discrimination (Alderson forthcoming). 
These rights can equally well be considered under the traditional rubric of the need, 
welfare or best interests of the child. The UNCRC participation rights are different, in 
being moderate versions of adults’ autonomy and civil rights, and some of these are 
often considered to begin to be relevant to young people aged from 10, 12 or 14 
years. Participation rights include qualified freedoms of expression, information, 
thought, conscience and religion, association and peaceful assembly, set out in 
articles 13-15, which are subject to the “national law, public safety, order, health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. A further constraint is 
that although English law in Gillick respects the decisions of competent children, the 
UNCRC leaves the final decision making to adults and asks adults only to give “due 
weight” to the child’s views according to age and maturity (12). Some participation 
rights relate more obviously to babies: the right to life, to a name, an identity, a 
nationality, children’s rights to have contact with parents and family, to respect for 
their worth and inherent human dignity as valued members of society, and to respect 
for their cultural background. All the UNCRC rights can relate to young children 
(Alderson, 2000), and this paper will consider how the participation rights also relate 
to premature babies who survive birth from as early as 22 weeks gestation. The next 
section reviews insights from research about children’s and babies’ competencies 
and abilities to participate in their care and relationships.    
 
New understandings of childhood and babyhood 
Traditionally, children have been viewed as pre-social beings, who are developing 
and being socialised by adults towards the endpoint of mature adulthood (Mayall, 
2002:4-5). The positive concept of development, of gradually becoming more 
informed, skilled, rational and reliable, has an inevitable negative converse side: 
deficit models of younger children as ignorant, incompetent, pre-rational and volatile. 
However, researchers have increasingly questioned this deficit model, and have 
examined how childhood is socially constructed, defined and practised in different 
societies. They have asked: how and why adults construct children as non-
competent (as women used to be constructed); how young children’s essential 
vulnerable dependence may be increased by ascribed and taught incompetence and 
helplessness; how adults’ interests and authority are served by keeping children in 
an often imposed and prolonged dependence, which countless children around the 
world and in the past have shown is neither inevitable nor essential (John, 2003). 
Just as concepts of gender inequalities have been key to understanding womanhood 
and women’s social status, so “the concept of generation is key to understanding 
childhood” (Mayall, 2002:120; Alanen, 2001), to see how childhood is socially 
constructed through numerous changing beliefs, behaviours and adult-child 
relationships (James and Prout, 1997). Detailed observations show how young 
children can be highly competent - technically, cognitively, socially and morally 
(Dunn, 1987; Gardner, 1993; Hutchby and Moran Ellis, 1998; Alderson, 2000). More 
than being actors, young children can be agents: people who negotiate with others, 
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and alter relationships or decisions or the working of social assumptions or 
constraints (Mayall, 2002:21). Researchers therefore have questioned the assumed 
gradual ascent from zero at birth up to adulthood.  
  Since the 1960s, psychologists have recognised newborn babies as “agents 
creating their own environments in interactions with their caretakers” (Bell, 1968 cited 
in Wolke, 1995:117). Babies contribute to the parent-infant dyad and to their own 
development. They seek comforting stimuli, and avoid and shut out unwanted stimuli 
by habituation (getting used to and coming to ignore repeated stimuli) and by going 
to sleep. They have a range of self-soothing behaviours, and they “speak” in an 
expressive language of sounds, facial expressions and body movements that can be 
“read’. Babies vary greatly in how far they have a robust capacity to learn to handle 
multiple stimuli, to organise themselves, to interact with the complex environment, 
and to control their states so that they can avoid becoming overwhelmed and 
disorganised. Babies also vary in how cuddly they are by nestling or moulding 
themselves against the carer’s body, and in how readily they take part in social 
interactions, turning to sounds, tracking, gazing, smiling and becoming excited or 
irritable, as well as how soon they become exhausted, which they signal by 
becoming pale or mottled, with altered breathing, hiccoughs, yawns and regurgitating 
or gagging and crying  (Brazelton, 1961; Brazelton and Nugent, 1995; Murray and 
Andrews, 2000).  
  Researchers’ deeper awareness of newborn babies’ “marvellous” and “amazing” 
capacities has followed two key insights, which treat assessment as a means of 
participating in social interaction. First, observers must always take account of the 
baby’s state or level of awareness, from deeply or lightly asleep, to drowsy or alert, to 
becoming upset or crying intensely (Brazelton, 1961). Second, observers must be 
self-aware and receptive, moving beyond a distanced objective view that treats the 
baby as an object, towards experiencing a dynamic personal emotional interaction 
with the baby, sensitively following each baby’s cues to help them to give a “best 
performance”. “New born infants are social beings who quickly learn to judge the 
safeness of a situation from the examiner’s facial expression and voice, as well as 
from the way they are handled” (Brazelton and Nugent, 1995:2, 11). The NBAS - 
Neonatal Behavioural Assessment Scale - systematically documents term babies’ 
responses to aversive and non-aversive stimuli, and scores behaviours taking careful 
note of the baby’s states. Babies’ behaviour is recognised not as wholly biological, 
driven by instincts and genetically programmed development, but also as social, 
learned and responsive (Vygotsky, 1962; Bruner, 1990; Fifer and Moon, 1994; 
Siegal, 1997). “Nurture” shapes “nature”, when individual’s experiences alter the 
structure of the brain, before and after birth (Shatz, 1992; Greenfield, 2000). 
Research interest has grown in how babies “participate”, “take part” and are 
“partners” in their learning and social relationships.    
  These participatory approaches have been applied to preterm babies “as socially 
competent and active partner[s]” with their caregivers, “seeking and eliciting” 
interactions “to assure self-actualization”, and actively shaping their own 
development; “self-actualization is participation with the world and interaction with 
another…with a maximum of joint validation” (Als, 1999:31, 33, 35). NIDCAP - 
Newborn Individualized Developmental Care and Assessment Programme – involves 
naturalistic observations of even the smallest most fragile preterm babies from the 
first week after birth to record the baby’s strengths and sensitivities (not deficits) and 
to identify goals and recommendations for care (Als, 1981). Babies’ behaviour or 
language is understood in three subsystems: autonomic (breathing, heart rate, skin 
colour, hiccoughing, regurgitating); motor (body tone, posture, facial and body 
movements); and state (patterns of transferring between the states described earlier) 
(Als, 1981, 1999). NIDCAP sessions last at least 60-90 minutes and observe the 
environment and the baby’s behaviours and interactions with carers, in order to 
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educate and support the caregivers and to plan care that will enhance the baby’s 
wellbeing and competence.   
  As this brief review indicates, decades of evidence-based recommendations have 
been derived from forms of participative research that meticulously observe and 
listen to babies and try to perceive their views and learn their language. Whereas the 
fetus floats in warm fluid, gently bumping against the sides of the uterus, sensing 
muted sound and diurnal light, and not needing to feed, or digest, or breathe, or cope 
with gravity and temperature changes, premature babies have to learn to manage 
without all these protections before they are ready to do so. Premature babies also 
have to cope with high levels of light, noise, and painful procedures in some NICU, 
where lighting levels may sometimes be 40 times brighter than the recommended 
level for adults’ office lighting (Glass, 1988), and the noise may be 120 decibels, well 
above the maximum 50 decibels recommended for offices (Graven et al., 1992). 
Compared with babies at home, babies in NICU have much less cuddling, 
comforting, and care from a few adults who can give sensitive individualised 
responses to the baby’s cues described above. At times during the first forty weeks, 
the human brain grows by 250,000 neurones per minute (Purves, 1994), and there is 
particular concern for how the immensely rapidly growing premature baby’s brain can 
best be protected and nurtured, by adapting “neonatal caring routines to the 
autonomy of the infant” (Lagercrantz, 2003). There have been long debates on 
whether premature babies should be treated more like a fetus or like a term baby, 
and whether they are over-stimulated by direct sensations in the NICU that would be 
muted in utero, or else are under-stimulated by missing the gentle sounds, colours, 
lighting, tastes, touch-sensations and free movements that the fetus enjoys. Wolke 
(1989) concludes that babies are both over-stimulated when bombarded with 
adverse stimuli and also miss comforting contingent stimuli responsive to their own 
cues and needs.  
  There are many practical recommended ways to increase premature babies’ 
participation in their health care, development and relationships. For example, from 
24 weeks, babies tighten their eyelids and from 30 weeks they close their eyelids in 
response to bright lights. Subdued lighting helps babies from around 32 weeks to 
interact with carers when they fix, track and gaze. The baby’s gaze promotes 
parents’ affection, “launching both partners on their path of complex affective and 
cognitive interchange, fuelling mutual competence” (Als, 1999:31). Babies have 
fewer disruptions to their breathing and heart rate and fewer startle reactions when 
noise is managed with appropriate acoustic design and the staff work quietly (Mann 
et al., 1986; Philbin et al., 1999). If premature babies lie supine with their limbs 
outspread, it is harder for them to do their main tasks: to breathe, to conserve 
energy, to sleep, and therefore to be able to feed and grow. They struggle against 
gravity to gather themselves together into the fetal position, limbs together, hands 
near face so that they can settle themselves, by bringing their hands to their face or 
sucking their fingers. Some neonatal staff take care to help babies to find and stay in 
their preferred position, by tucking them into soft fabric nests or rolls (Als, 1999; 
Boxwell, 2000:30-34). From 32-34 weeks, babies can coordinate their breathing, 
sucking and swallowing while learning to feed (Goldson, 1999). Care that is 
consistently responsive to the individual baby’s cues helps to prevent babies from 
becoming stressed, disorganised and unstable, while promoting rewarding 
interactions between babies and carers (Gottfried, 1985). Care needs to be 
synchronised with each baby’s signs of strength and sensitivity, seen in behaviours 
that are characteristically either approaching and exploring or avoiding and 
withdrawing (Als, 1999:33). Skin-to-skin holding (“kangaroo mother care”) benefits 
the baby and parent, stimulates breastfeeding, and promotes health and earlier 
discharge, its advantages have been demonstrated by research, and it has been 
predicted to “become the standard of care throughout the world within 10 years” 
(Anderson, 1999:152). 
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  NBAS and NIDCAP promote appropriate care for babies individually and also 
generally when they are used to evaluate NICU standards, and to plan new 
structures and systems. Yet despite randomised research evidence of the 
advantages of what might be termed “baby-led” policies, many NICUs still disregard 
this evidence or say that it is too weak. Whether neonatal staff spend time interacting 
with the babies appears to depend rather arbitrarily on how important the staff 
consider this to be, regardless of staffing levels, and also on how much individual 
babies initiate vocal and visual interactions (Linn et al, 1985). Goldson (1999:3-4) 
notes that although all members of the highly trained neonatal team are committed to 
each child’s survival and optimal development, “yet they function and perform their 
work in environments that may not be conducive to their own well-being or to the 
well-being of the infants they are committed to be caring for.” White (1992) asks why 
“noxious” NICU continue to be built. Goldson (1999:13-14) deplores the lack of 
research-based practice in many units, and speculates on whether this neglect is 
related to systems-based rather than individual-based models of care, that set the 
convenience and working needs of the staff before the needs of the family, besides 
cost and space constraints. The following sections review and illustrate specific 
participation rights, after explaining the research from which the examples are drawn.     
 
The neonatal research 
An ethnographic study, 2002-2004, observed four NICU in southern England 
(Alderson et al., 2004). Semi-structured tape-recorded interviews were held with 40 
senior neonatal staff and, in the units and in their homes, with a purposive sample of 
the parents of 80 babies at risk of neuro-developmental problems. The research 
investigated: how relatively new neonatal treatments, techniques, knowledge and 
ethical guidance complicate or illuminate long-standing neonatal dilemmas; how 
clinicians select, evaluate and manage the many neurologically related issues, when 
making diagnoses, prognoses and treatment plans, and when discussing these with 
parents and colleagues; how parents and babies experience and respond to the 
NICU; the strengths and gaps in current knowledge and practice; and how 
multidisciplinary insights can inform care that is in babies present and future best 
interests. The transcripts and observation notes were analysed for replies to the 
research questions and for themes raised by participants (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
The data were analysed qualitatively, not in order to test a hypothesis or to measure 
incidence, but to analyse and try to explain current policies and practice. This paper 
analyses the data in the light of child rights perspectives.   
     
Participation rights 
The right to life (6) 
The first participation right, from which all others follow, is that “every child has the 
inherent right to life [and] to the maximum extent possible survival and development” 
(6). The rights to life and to protection from torture (37) are commonly counted 
among the few absolute rights. Sadly, for premature babies neither right is absolute, 
partly because they can conflict. Several neonatal staff referred during their 
interviews to painful but life-sustaining treatment sometimes as “torture”. The right to 
life as survival can also potentially conflict with the quality-of-life rights: the right to 
the maximum extent possible of development (6), to the highest attainable standard 
of health (24), and to an adequate standard of living (27). Andrew was born at 22 
weeks, and his parents were asked to decide if his treatment should continue. “We 
said we found the decision a very difficult one to make, because if he did survive we 
might be imposing a lifetime of suffering on him” (research number 1.20). So if a 
baby seemed to be very unlikely to survive, or to gain from painful treatment, or to 
have a future without severe suffering and serious impairment (in re B [1981] 1WLR 
1421), the adults began to discuss whether treatment should legally be withheld or 
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withdrawn, and the baby be allowed to die, as debated in an extensive literature 
(RCPCH, 1997; BMA, 2001; McHaffie, 2001).   
  The usual policy at birth in Britain, if the baby appears to have some hope of 
survival, is to provide any necessary life-sustaining treatment in order to allow time to 
conduct tests and enable senior practitioners and parents to share in making 
informed decisions. NICU vary in the age of viability that they will accept; fewer units 
admit babies aged less than 24 or 23 weeks. Practitioners refer to a window of time 
while the baby depends on mechanical life support and it is still possible to decide to 
withdraw treatment. If the baby survives long enough to breathe independently, a 
decision to end life alters from “allowing the baby to die” by withdrawing mechanical 
ventilation into, more controversially, withdrawing fluids and nutrition.   
  Medical ethics is influenced by high expectations of the threshold for a “reasonable” 
quality of life free from impairment and for an intellectual form of personhood, and 
low expectations of babies’ capacities and awareness. Harris (1985) asserts that no 
babies can value their own life and therefore their life has no value. Singer (1995) 
and others regard babies as non-persons (and therefore non-human-rights holders), 
lacking five “ethically relevant characteristics”: consciousness; the capacity to interact 
with others; having conscious preferences for continued life; having enjoyable 
experiences; and having relatives who will grieve at their death. In response, Wyatt 
(1998: 167-8) describes the many parents he has known who relate to their 
premature baby as a unique, precious member of the human community, an 
individual, with a history, an identity and a name, not a thing but a person to be 
treated with gentleness and respect, irreplaceable, a beloved child.  
  There are four criteria and kinds of evidence for considering whether babies are 
persons with human rights to life. Firstly legal, all babies from birth are recognised as 
persons with rights (HRA, 1998; UNCRC, 1989). Secondly societal, although society 
gains economically from treating impaired and unwanted babies as expendable, it is 
debated whether these cost-effective values increase human happiness and 
wellbeing, though that is a topic beyond this paper. Third is the value of premature 
and impaired babies to their parents and other carers, and our interviews and 
observations confirmed the overwhelming view in the empirical literature that these 
babies are very highly valued, loved, and grieved for; if withholding treatment is 
reluctantly considered, the primary concern is the best interests of the baby. Fourth 
are the rarely reported babies’ own experiences and responses, and adults’ 
perceptions of these, reviewed in this paper.   
  The right to life is often discussed as if this is something that adults allow or support, 
and babies receive. However, many premature babies put much energy and 
concentration into surviving as if, consciously or not, they value their life. When 
William (all the babies’ names have been changed), born at 30 weeks, was aged 9 
months, his mother was interviewed while she bottle-fed him. He still had a look of 
intense anxious concentration as he managed his breathing and struggled to suck 
and to cope, it seemed, with a bloated feeling after each short feed. Like some other 
babies, from soon after birth William gazed at his mother’s face, as if he depended 
on her loving support. The pleasure or reassurance that some babies evinced when 
held by their parents or by nurses they knew well showed that, to some degree, they 
had all five of Singer’s above “ethical” characteristics. 
   
Interviewer:     And was there anything in him do you think that helped to get 
you all through [the time in NICU]? 
William’s mother:        I think they’re amazing… babies, generally… a lot of 
the conversations between the [other] mothers come back to this, that they 
look very frail but they’re not - determined little - the will to live, I mean it’s 
obviously not as conscious as that in a baby, but the life thing is so strong, 
they’ll fight and fight and fight and you start respecting them for that, you 
know, he’s been much iller than I’ve ever been - never had me in intensive 
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care, but they kind of keep going and you end up feeling really quite in awe of 
that (research number 3:15) [ - means pause, … means words omitted]. 
 
Many parents and practitioners described similar admiration, and gave examples of 
babies continuing to survive against all expectations, or sometimes unexpectedly 
“giving up” as if, in some ways, the babies had the final say in whether they lived or 
died.   
 
The right of a child to a name and nationality (7) and to preserve his or her identity 
(8) 
The baby’s first name is a crucial way to enable everyone in the NICU to identify and 
relate to the baby as a unique person. The family name denotes the baby’s family 
membership, history and, often, ethnicity. Some first names are significant as the 
names of loved relatives, or they describe the baby. “Yemi’s” elder sister had lived for 
only one day, and he was born at 24 weeks with a 20 per cent chance of survival, 
after a delayed journey in an ambulance that got lost. He stayed in the NICU for 6 
months. His mother said: “His real name means ‘remembered by God’. I thought how 
appropriate because he could have been born on the steps of the flat, so I always 
think God was watching over him” (2.20).  
  Babies participate by sustaining and rejuvenating and assuring the future of their 
society and nation. Having a name and a nationality enables the child to be 
registered, and therefore to be entitled to the UNCRC rights because these entail 
recognition by “state parties”. Babies are then entitled to state services such as free 
neonatal care in Britain. 
  “Identity” refers to personal characteristics and agency. Adults frequently described 
babies’ distinctive responses and contrasted these with the characteristics of other 
babies or siblings. James was born at 31 weeks and was on cpap, a breathing aid. 
Some babies pulled on their tubes and the medical notes often recorded “self-
extubated”. James’s mother described how he guided her caring:  
 
He doesn’t like cpap he pulls it out sometimes, he has pulled all his tubes out 
and then he is really happy when everything is out and he can be his own 
person.  Yes I see him as a person, sitting and watching him for hours, 
learning about what he likes. He likes lying on his left side on his tummy, not 
on his right side. And he’s also like his father, he dislikes anyone playing with 
his feet, even if he’s sedated if you touch his foot he’ll squiggle but he likes 
his head and chin and forehead and his back being stroked. If he’s on his 
right side he gets grumpier. You can learn more and more about your own 
baby…Stroking him does sometimes help, and talking to him, that sometimes 
stops him crying, but I have to be careful not to get him too excited because 
then his respiration rate goes up…You’re projecting things from yourself and 
when he is awake and in a bad mood I see a lot of fighting spirit…If I talk to 
him such as while he is having blood taken, he calms down (3.4).   
 
One doctor described seemingly lasting identity or characteristics when as children 
grew older they continued to be the “good” girl or the “extremely feisty” boy, and 
added: “There seem to be some very tenacious very strong characters…and they 
seem to be babies who do clinically very well” (1.24).  
  Another aspect of “identity” is personhood, and we picked two qualities, memories 
and emotions, to see if parents and practitioners believed that babies were beginning 
to be “persons” of the kind that philosophers might recognise. Several practitioners 
denied this possibility, or said, “I hope not”, as if neonatal care would be less painful 
for babies without memories or emotions. Research by Brazelton, Als and others 
records specific emotional capacities. During our observations and interviews we 
saw, or heard adults describe, babies who appeared to express hurt, misery, calm, 
 9 
contentment, relief, pleasure and excitement. One counsellor’s views were shared by 
several neonatal colleagues:   
  
Yes I definitely think they have emotions and memories. I think they definitely 
know the difference between the touch of a parent and the touch of a nurse or 
a doctor, and…that if a parent touches them that’s going to be a loving touch 
and caring touch. The businesslike touch of a doctor is going to be very 
different. One can almost see the child cringe or tense…You see the 
difference in the reaction when the parent arrives there is an excitement it’s 
incredible but it may sound mad but I do think having been looking at the 
babies for so many years when their parent arrives the number of times I’ve 
said to the parents, “They know you are here, they are excited to see you 
they are pleased.” You can actually tell these things from a 23 weeker, which 
is amazing. And of course they have a memory, I think they understand 
whether they are going to have an [intervention]. I think the memory…is 
unthinkable but it’s knowable (1.25). 
 
To recognise babies as sensitive persons with these kinds of memories and 
emotions raises vital questions about how neonatal care can respect babies’ rights to 
“preserve” their identity.   
  
The right to contact with family and parents (5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 20, 22, 24, 27) A 
child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when 
[this] is necessary for the best interests of the child (9) 
The UNCRC, far from being a vision of selfish competing rights, repeatedly 
emphasises participation: solidarity, equality, communities of peace and justice, and 
rights that are respected through relationships, beginning with the family. The 
UNCRC respects “the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents” (5). Besides 
having “contact” with their family, babies actively contribute: they create and 
perpetuate families by enabling their parents to realise the right to “found a family” 
(HRA, 1998). The attachment between children and parents, central to family life, 
appears to be especially nurtured by close physical contact between parents and the 
active social baby during the early weeks and months (Odent, 1999; Murray and 
Andrews, 2000; Matthiesen et al., 2001).  
  Parents believed that their babies knew them early on.  
 
Joe’s mother:  I really think Joe worked out who I was very early on…there’d 
be people around him doing things…and then I’d walk in the room and start 
talking and it was obvious that he looked towards my voice…and change and 
get a bit excited, get a bit jumpy…(1.12). 
 
Chima’s mother: Even when he is sleeping and I come in, he opens his eyes 
and looks around. I think he knows my smell or something (3.3). 
 
For babies, “contact” means close emotional and physical ties. The staff varied in 
how soon and how enthusiastically they encouraged parents to touch and hold 
premature babies, and helped parents if they were afraid of harming their baby. 
Some nurses believed that skin-to-skin cuddling made babies too cold and stressed, 
in reverse of the research evidence. Although parents tended to accept their own 
unit’s policies, not knowing of possible alternatives, some were disappointed to have 
missed earlier opportunities, and others had to ask the staff to allow such contact. 
This could be hard when parents felt the staff might disapprove, or would criticise, or 
possibly blame parents if problems arose from their initiative. Adults might be more 
confident if they regarded this contact as the baby’s right. Although soft cotton 
clothes and covers “facilitate restfulness and comfort” (Als, 1999:55), in some NICU, 
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the babies are nursed nude and stay in incubators to keep them warm. In other units, 
they wear clothes and hats, and are moved out of incubators as soon as possible, 
promoting closer contact between babies and caregivers. James’s mother described 
the link many parents made between contact as touch, relationship, and 
communication.  
 
It would be impossible for me to wait four weeks before touching him as some 
parents say they do. How could you build a relationship with your child? 
When you take him out and cuddle him, the mother or the father, you are fully 
involved, he calms right down (3.4). 
   
  Over time, baby-parent contact alters some parents’ views and experiences of the 
family. Henry’s mother described how she grieved and mentally had a “tough hard 
time” because he had Down’s syndrome, but how also they had a “wonderful” first 
year together: “he is a real blessing to me”. She would not wish to change Henry 
because “if he didn’t have Down’s syndrome he wouldn’t be the same person” (3.1). 
She spoke of her son’s practical and emotional agency. He had transformed her life, 
for example, she did not return to her career as she had planned. And when asked 
what was the best and most helpful part of the neonatal unit, Henry’s mother recalled 
the nurse who said to her, “These children they choose their parents, and this child 
has chosen you.”  Rather like the counsellor’s view earlier, that babies’ memory is 
“unthinkable but knowable”, Henry’s mother believed that from the start “he probably 
felt loved, some very prime, primordial, what’s the word, deep way, they pick these 
things up, babies, they are very aware.”   
  During the most private period, after birth, families have to cope with being in the 
noisy public NICU, and they need ways that help them to relax, to overcome 
separating barriers, and sustain intimate contact: curtained alcoves, reclining chairs, 
rooms for parents to stay and to eat, recognition of fathers’ responsibilities  (UNCRC: 
18; Killen et al. forthcoming) help with transport, cots for twins and triplets to share as 
soon as possible. NICUs’ provision of these facilities varied widely. The access and 
support can be seen as practical respect for babies’ rights to tactile family contact 
that promotes babies’ restful sleep and stable breathing, and parents’ calm fulfilment 
(Als, 1999:55).   
     
Freedom of association and peaceful assembly (15) 
Respect for the child’s cultural background, and inherent human dignity (30,31, 37, 
39)  
NICUs restrict general visitors’ access in order to preserve quiet and privacy, and 
some units limit parents’ access. After the babies go home many parents avoid 
groups and family gatherings for fear of infection. Parents often found it hard to talk 
to relatives who did not understand their intense anxiety, and they appreciated 
sharing support with other parents in the unit, although some units discouraged this 
when, for example, parents were told not to look at or ask or talk about other babies, 
no parent support group was arranged, and mothers spoke of meeting to talk only 
outside the unit. So while they would most appreciate support from their extended 
family and welcoming ceremonies to affirm the child’s cultural background and dignity 
as a valued new member of the family, parents could feel isolated, as Iwu’s Nigerian 
mother described.   
  
I go to see my baby and the nurses say, “Oh no you can’t see your baby, it is 
not allowed, you know.” Yes. If you ask anything about the next baby they 
say, “Don’t ask, we don’t have permission to talk about that, everything is 
confidential you know…” And you cannot go in to see the baby unless you are 
with the baby’s parents, and so I have to take the family visitors in and be 
there with them, not friends I don’t want them to come in to see her until she 
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is well and everything is ok for her, they come to see me here [maternity 
ward]. Yes, I do need to see them. On Sunday a lot came, so even the staff 
had to ask them, “Oh you know this visiting time is over” [laughs] (3.5).    
 
There are important reasons to limit and defer some of these participation rights but 
they are noted here as a reminder of some of the extra difficult differences that 
parents and babies experience after premature birth.  
 
The child’s right to express views freely in all matters affecting the child:   
the views of the child to be given due weight according to the age and ability of the 
child (12)  
The key participation right, to express views freely, involves being able to form views 
and having the means of expression, and this section begins with expression through 
the body and the voice. The baby’s cry could be highly significant to parents. Anna’s 
parents had one living daughter and their three other babies had died. Anna was 
born by caesarean section at 26 weeks weighing only 500 grams, and her mother 
heard Anna several hours before she could go to see her in the NICU.   
 
She cried when she was first born which we heard, which was pretty 
amazing, absolutely wonderful…her cry, which was something we thought 
we’d never hear, it was amazing. Absolutely amazing, it was lovely…they said 
she’s got 50-50 chance of survival (4.1). 
 
Although they find it distressing, parents are pleased when their baby grows strong 
enough to cry. “It’s nice you can tell when he really has got the hump” (2.1).  
 
It is not very easy when he cries but I also know that it is nice that he can cry. 
It was eerie…with all the babies on ventilators…at least they can cry when 
they are off the ventilator. It is a nice sound, human, not that I want him to be 
in pain…it is more that they cry when they don’t like something. They tell you 
(3.4).  
 
Parents appreciate the nurses who comfort crying babies whose parents are away. 
Paediatricians are advised to read the babies’ appearance and behaviour, for 
example, in order to assess and relieve their pain (RCPCH, 1997a), which many 
practitioners take care to do, such as when a nurse talks gently and soothes the baby 
while a doctor inserts a line. Babies appear to distinguish between the gentle and 
painful simultaneous touching (Murdoch and Darlow, 1984) and noticeably cry less 
and quieten sooner when supported in this way. Not all staff are trained and 
supported to do this and some nurses hold a baby’s arm still, do not look at the 
crying baby and walk away when the doctor has finished, while the baby cries, 
sometimes for long periods. The units differ in how far they give “due weight” to 
babies’ basic expressions of distress or pleasure. Babies are most vocal in special 
care, the final room before they go home, which in some units resounds with frequent 
crying, whereas in other quieter units nursery nurses and parents spend hours 
cuddling and soothing the babies (Warren, 2001; Bond, 2002). The babies’ 
expressed views on feeding are central to their healthcare, reviewed in another paper 
(Alderson forthcoming a).   
  When making the most serious decisions, adults might give, or have to give, “due 
weight” to the baby’s “views” (however loosely these might be “formed”). Anna’s 
mother described how twice Anna had rallied, contrary to the doctor’s warnings. 
  
And I feel so sorry for him [doctor] because it’s like she’s calling him a liar 
[laughs], which I am very pleased about. [Once, before the doctors could put 
her back on the ventilator, Anna’s breathing rate suddenly improved.] It’s like 
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she’s playing games with us here! [And she’s saying] “I’m going to prove them 
wrong. I’m going to be okay” (4.1). 
 
Anna’s parents decided that they could cope with a child with learning difficulties. 
“What we can’t cope with is no child at all.” But eventually they agreed that if Anna’s 
breathing failed the doctors would try re-ventilation, despite the extremely low chance 
of her survival, though they would not attempt resuscitation if her heart stopped. 
“Stubborn yes, and she fights hard for her - to sort of get better [but] if her heart was 
to stop beating that’s her way of saying, ‘I’ve had enough. I can’t cope any more’“ 
(4.1). Anna died when she was 4 months old. It cannot be certain that babies 
“choose” to live or to die, still less express a choice by doing so, but neither can it be 
proved that they have no views on how long they continue the effort to survive when 
they are extremely weak and ill, or why some babies surmount far greater problems 
than others mange to. Some parents attributed outcomes partly to their child’s view 
and personality.  
 
Andrew’s mother:   Yes, I think he definitely chose to live, because there were 
a couple of points where I would have exited. I have to say I would have left 
this life…He was incredibly ill…he was dying effectively, and the doctors were 
saying that, “You know it’s not good,” and I kind of got this feeling that he had 
decided, “No actually I am not ready to go. I want to live,” because then he 
would come back in from his sort of dying, and he would be fine. Well not 
quite but he would be different, and I feel that he chose to live…he’s just 
incredibly determined (1.20). 
 
Some neonatologists similarly spoke in terms of babies’ agency.  
 
Int:  Do you think there are qualities in babies that help them? 
1.23: I think it is remarkable. I have enormous respect for these little babies, 
and sometimes the way they cling on to life is extraordinary. I don’t 
know…this will to live somehow…A-- nearly died about three or four times. It 
was extraordinary how this little body, this little soul kept winning through. So 
yes, I think there are but I don’t know how to describe that quality but I think it 
is remarkable.  
 
  An important “view” that many babies expressed clearly was their preference to be 
cared for by their parents and by certain nurses, as if the emotional relationship of 
care mattered as much to them as the activities of care.  
 
There are certain nurses that know an awful lot about Sean, and are very 
fond of Sean, and Sean is very good when they are looking after him. And 
there are other nurses that [pause] I would say he picks up on their mood, 
and if they’re not as confident with him as some of the other nurses, he does 
pick up on that, and he gets a bit upset. And I have noticed that quite a lot 
with him…Most of the time you know when he doesn’t want you to touch him, 
especially when he cries, but there are there are certain nurses that he – it’s 
kind of, it’s hard to explain, you do feel like he’s taking a certain amount more 
from some than others… (2.1). 
 
When he was two months old (born at 25 weeks), Sean’s mother described his 
communication. In some units, babies are bathed quickly, but in others the babies set 
the pace and are wrapped in a sheet at first, until they show when they are ready to 
enjoy the water (Warren, 2001). 
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He’s a very fussy little boy…even when he was in an incubator and he had a 
tube down his throat…you would soon know if there was something that he 
didn’t like, so he’s a good communicator…one minute the hands are out there 
to say “stop”, and the next minute he’s crying cos he wants to be picked up, 
so he’s very finicky. [During his first bath] he was wrapped up for it but he 
pretty much decided to degown himself. He enjoyed it. He was amazing, so 
relaxed, and he cried when I took him out (2.1).        
 
Countless observed and reported examples in the four NICU showed that many 
adults were convinced that they were not mechanically caring for the unconscious 
organisms that some philosophers allege babies to be. Instead, they were interacting 
within human relationships influenced by the babies’ views. They confirmed Fischer 
and Rose (1994): “Because an infant is seen as continuously and actively self-
constructing, the task of care becomes one of collaboration with the infant…by 
actively interpreting an infant’s behaviour, one can construct an appropriate care-
giving environment [with] even the earliest, most fragile infants.” Als (1999:35-9) 
advises that repeated detailed observations and records “may then form the basis for 
care giving suggestions and modifications in environmental structuring”. The records 
see “the infant as an active structurer and participant in his or her own development,” 
with care guided by the infant’s needs and efforts, not purely the practitioner’s plans. 
Als gives the individual example of adjusting the ventilator settings when the baby is 
trying to breathe with rather than against the machine. General conclusions may also 
be drawn from the babies’ views, and from skilled observations, to inform NICU-wide 
policies to create baby-friendly units when practitioners respect and trust babies and 
parents (Als, 1999:58).  
 
The opportunity to be heard directly or through a representative during proceedings 
that affect the child, and periodic review (12, 25)  
Freedom of expression and information (12, 13, 23, 24) of thought, conscience and 
religion (14) 
Disabled children should enjoy a full and decent life in conditions which ensure 
dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate the child’s active participation in the 
community with the fullest possible social inclusion (23) 
These articles endorse babies’ rights, through their parents and other caregivers, to 
the regular and free exchange of information, so that whenever possible reviews, 
assessments, plans and decisions may be made that take account of babies’ 
ascertained views and the values of the family. Article 23 partly resolves the potential 
conflict noted earlier between rights to survival and to an adequate standard of living, 
by advocating disabled children’s fullest possible participation, an aim to which 
neonatal treatment and preventive care are dedicated. Parents and practitioners are 
assisted in being informed advocates for premature babies when they have 
multidisciplinary training and support, libraries and other “access to information and 
material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed 
at the promotion of [babies’] social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and 
mental health” (16).  
  
Conclusion  
This paper has aimed to illustrate the relevance of participation rights to all children, 
by showing their relevance to those most likely to be excluded, premature babies. 
Examples from the NICU illustrate how respect for premature babies’ participation 
rights is feasible in the experience of some adults who know and care for babies, and 
treat them as people who can to some extent form and express relevant views. 
Babies’ rights hold immediate and urgent messages in being the means to set and 
assess standards of care in neonatal units that promote the babies’ health and 
welfare, and the family relationships on which they so greatly depend. The protection, 
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provision and participation UNCRC articles are integral and key concerns in NICU 
policy and practice, whether they are explicitly honoured or not, and because the 
rights are sometimes disregarded, attention to the UNCRC is an indispensable guide 
to high standards of neonatal care.  
  The traditional language of children’s interests, needs and welfare tends to 
emphasise children’s passive helpless dependence on adults’ choices. The newer 
language of children’s rights, especially of participation, acknowledges that children 
too can be informed choosers, agents and contributors with views that can guide and 
inform individual baby’s care and wider neonatal policies and practices. Babies 
participate by sharing in the creation and growth of families and communities. More 
than actors, babies can be agents who alter relationships, decisions and the working 
of social assumptions or constraints (Mayall, 2002:21). The understanding of babies’ 
rights grows through the understanding of babies’ aware consciousness within 
human relationships; these two understandings can justify and validate one another. 
When babies are accepted to have a certain degree of consciousness, certain 
obligations by adults follow: to value the babies’ present life now, besides their 
potential and future; and to try to hear and respect babies’ views.  
  In some ways, it is more important that adults respect what they understand to be 
babies’ views and rights, than that they try to prove that babies have an arbitrary 
level of consciousness high enough to count as a human-rights-holding personhood, 
because rights partly become real in being respected, just as babies learn to speak 
through being spoken to for months as if they can already speak. Conversely, the 
rights and autonomy of highly competent adults can be denied and ignored, in the 
example of prisoners of conscience, so that rights exist in perception and relationship 
besides in objective reality. Children’s rights also exist in an independent reality in the 
very carefully worded UNCRC, by far the most widely agreed international treaty. 
And by ratifying the Convention in 1991, the British government undertook to 
implement it. The UNCRC speaks of all members of the human family, a continuum 
of life without discrete stages, and the expressive views of premature babies illustrate 
how inclusive and diverse the UNCRC participation rights can be. Freeman (2002) 
reviews how normative rights become convincing neither through truth claims nor 
through subjective preferences, but through Kantian concepts of communal or 
universal “common sense” that imaginatively respects other people’s perspectives or 
standpoints and their common humanity. This paper has aimed to imagine premature 
babies’ human perspectives, and also to suggest integral, embodied, and commonly 
sensed bases for the rights of every member of the human family.   
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